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This research focuses on the protection of the commercial speech in the United States and 
Europe. The protection of commercial speech is regarded as one of the most controversial issues 
in both European and American free speech jurisprudence. The purpose of this work is to 
compare different approaches to the protection of the commercial speech in the American and 
European countries through an analysis of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice of the European Union. This 
analysis demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court gives commercial speech intermediate level 
of protection. In contrast, while the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of 
Justice declared commercial speech to be protected, in practice both Courts deny the protection 
by refusing to overrule limitations on commercial speech. Moreover, both European Courts leave 
much discretion to Member States to decide whether or not the commercial speech should be 
restricted. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech is “one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of 
the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self fulfillment.”TP
1
PT Freedom of 
speech is one of the most important conditions for the progress and self-realization of each 
person in society. One cannot develop one’s own personality without first being able to voice 
whatever one wishes to think.TP
2
PT Several other reasons exist for the special protection of speech. 
First, “speech is recognized as valuable, because public debate is a useful instrument for 
achieving other social objectives.”TP
3
PT Second, the possibility for personal expression is a public 
good itself.TP
4
PT The freedom of speech is an instrument for achieving truth and knowledge. TP
5
PT 
Freedom of speech is currently is one of the most widely recognized human rights. The 
overwhelming majority of constitutions throughout the world have an article or specific clause 
for the protection of the freedom of speech.TP
6
PT While about ninety percent of the constitutions in 
the world guarantee the freedom of speech, only sixty-six percent prohibit the use of torture.TP
7
PT 
 
TP
1
PT Lingens v. Austria , 103 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) at 41 (1986). 
TP
2
PT Liz Heffernan ed., Human Rights: A European Perspective 201 (1994). 
TP
3
PT Mark W. Janis et al., European Human Rights Law 158 (1996).  
TP
4
PT Id. 
TP
5
PT Id. 
TP
6
PT See Hence van Maarseveen & Ger Van Der Tang, Written Constitutions: a Computerized Comparative Study 105, 
110 (1978). 
TP
7
PT Id. 
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The first versions of the freedom of speech assurance can be found in the United States 
Constitution and in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution says that “Congress shall make no law abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press.”TP
8
PT The freedom of speech in the United States is based on 
“the power of reason as applied through public discussion so they [judges] eschewed silence 
coerced by law.” TP
9
PT 
A great number of European Court of Human Rights cases involved freedom of speech 
issues. Section 1, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that “everyone 
has the right to freedom of expression” and “this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.” TP
10
PT  
Nevertheless, in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (hereinafter after 
Supreme Court), the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice of the 
European Union, it is observed that different categories of speech do not get the same level of 
protection. Moreover, some categories of speech, such as incitement, fighting words, libel, 
obscenity and child pornography are left outside the Court’s protection.TP
11
PT  
This paper will be focused on the protection of commercial speech in the United States 
and Europe. “Europe” in the context of this paper means Member States of the Council of 
Europe and of the European Union. In this light, this research will be more concentrated on 
human rights rather than constitutional rights because there is no common constitution existing 
 
TP
8
PT U.S. Const. amendm. I.  
TP
9
PT Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-6 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
TP
10
PT Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Texts, art.10 (1987). 
TP
11
PT See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 984 (15Pth P ed. 2004). 
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for all of Europe.TP
12
PT Therefore analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Justice decisions will demonstrate the basic principles of the doctrine in Europe. 
The European Court of Human Rights is a body of the Council of Europe and includes 
virtually all the countries of Europe as members (46 members).TP
13
PT The European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights) is a legal document of the Council of Europe.TP
14
PT The European Court of Human Rights is 
responsible for making judicial decisions on issues raised under the Convention.TP
15
PT  
The European Court of Justice belongs to a completely different supranational 
organization - the European Union, which includes 25 Member States,TP
16
PT most of which are 
Western European countries. However, there is a tendency towards including more Eastern 
European countries as well. The European Court of Justice is the central court for the settlement 
of disputes arising out of the Union’s legislation.TP
17
PT  The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht 
Treaty) was signed in 1992 incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights. TP
18
PT 
Therefore, the European case law analyzed in this research developed either under the 
European Convention on Human Rights as applied by the European Court of Human Rights; or 
under European Law as applied by the European Court of Justice. 
The protection of the commercial speech is regarded as one of the most controversial 
issues in the history of the both European and American jurisprudence. In the United States, 
 
TP
12
PT See Roger A. Shiner, Freedom of Commercial Expression 94 (2003). 
TP
13
PT See HTUhttp://www.coe.intUTH (last visited on Mar. 2005). 
TP
14
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 94-95. 
TP
15
PT Id at 95. 
TP
16
PT See “Member States” at HTUhttp://europa.eu.int/abc/index_en.htm#UTH (last visited on Mar. 2005). 
TP
17
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 94. 
TP
18
PT Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, art.F (Treaty of Maastricht). 
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commercial speech was excluded from the coverage of the First Amendment until 1976. TP
19
PT Since 
the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council,TP
20
PT commercial speech has been protected, although not absolutely protected.TP
21
PT  
In the European Court of Human Rights, expressions involving commercial or economic 
interests receive less protection than speech involving political issues. The European Court of 
Justice of the European Union has required that expression have a commercial aspect if its 
restriction is to raise a question under the mainly economic treaties under which the Court 
operates.TP
22
PT  
The purpose of this work is to compare different approaches to the protection of 
commercial speech in the American and European legal doctrines through an analysis of the 
cases of Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 
of the European Union. These cases also involve the historical and cultural traditions of the 
respective member states and nations involved. One of the main questions to be answered in this 
research is whether one kind of the commercial speech would be protected by one court and 
would not be protected by the other. Another problem that arises concerns the reduction in the 
level of commercial speech protection.  Unfortunately, the volume of research on this topic is 
very small. Moreover, there is a limited amount of research that compares US Supreme Court 
and European Court cases.  
What is the value of the commercial expression? Why should it be protected? While 
everybody understands the importance of political speech protection, necessity of commercial 
speech protection usually is not so obvious. However, it is impossible to imagine operation of the 
 
TP
19
PT See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech 54 (1985). 
TP
20
PT 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
TP
21
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1158-9. 
TP
22
PT See Janis, supra note 3 at 208-209 
 5
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
                                                
economic market without market participants having access to the information.TP
23
PT Free flow of 
information defines a free society. Notwithstanding the great value of the commercial speech, its 
protection was denied for a long time in the United States and Europe. 
However, for better understanding the subject at hand, it is important first to conduct a 
review of the nature of speech, and commercial speech particularly, and justifications for limits 
on speech. Thus, the next part will be focused on common tendencies in freedom of speech 
protection in the United States and Europe. The meaning of commercial speech and importance 
of its protection will be discussed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter is based on the 
historical emergence of the commercial speech doctrine in the United States. In the fifth chapter, 
the European doctrine of commercial speech protection will be analyzed. In the sixth chapter, 
courts’ decisions in the United States and Europe on the same subject matter as contraceptive 
and abortion advertisement; regulation of advertising of the legal professions and tobacco 
advertisement will be compared. 
This analysis will demonstrate that the U.S. Supreme Court gives commercial speech 
intermediate level of protection. In contrast, while the European Court of Human Rights and 
European Court of Justice declared commercial speech to be protected, in practice both Courts 
deny the protection by refusing to overrule limitations on commercial speech. Moreover, both 
European Courts leave much discretion to Member States to decide whether or not the 
commercial speech should be restricted. 
 
 
 
TP
23
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 94. 
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II.          FREEDOM OF SPEECH: DEFINITION, REASONS, RATIONALE AND 
LIMITS ON PROTECTION 
A. The Meaning of Speech 
 
What should the definition “speech” or “expression” include?TP
24
PT The nature of the 
“expression” protected by Article 10 of the European Convention, or by the First Amendment is 
not entirely clear. Courts have the power to interpret the law and answer the question whether or 
not the particular words or activity would be covered by the rule protecting freedom of speech.TP
25
PT  
One kind of “speech” at least is clear:TP
26
PT verbal speech, writing, or conduct “falls under 
the dictionary meaning of speech”.TP
27
PT However, what about questions concerning fraud, dishonest 
advertisement or provocation to murder?  
There is the important question of whether the “expression” should be distinguished from 
action. The intention or effect of some various forms of activity may be more “to convey ideas 
more generally transmitted by discussion or writing”.TP
28
PT  
In the American legal doctrine “speech” does not just cover words but such actions as 
burning the flag TP
29
PT and nude dancing.TP
30
PT For example, in Texas v. JohnsonTP
31
PT the U.S. Supreme 
 
TP
24
PT In the American Constitution there is term “freedom of speech” used. European Convention on Human Rights 
talks of “freedom of expression”. Courts use both words with the same meaning. However, there is an argument that 
the word “expression” is broader. See, e.g., F.Shauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 50-2  (1982). 
Throughout this paper both words will be used interchangeable. 
TP
25
PT See Barendt, supra note 18 at 37. 
TP
26
PT Id. 
TP
27
PT Id. at 38. 
TP
28
PT Id. at 37. 
TP
29
PT Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
TP
30
PT Schad v Borough of Mt.Ephraim, 425 U.S. 61 (1981). 
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Court held that “act of burning American flag during a protest rally was an expressive conduct 
within protection of First Amendment”.TP
32
PTT TAccording to the Supreme Court, to determine whether 
the First Amendment would cover the particular activity, “it is necessary to determine whether 
there was intent to convey a particularized message and whether the likelihood was great that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed it”T.TTP
33
PTT  
The European Court of Human Rights in its decisions has not focused on drawing 
distinctions between different types of actions.TP
34
PT Rather, the Court has concentrated more on the 
question of when public interference with expression may be permissible.TP
35
PT  
B. Justifying Limits on Expression  
 
1. Textual argument 
 
This section is focused on textual analysis and comparison of section 2, article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and provisions of the U.S. Constitution concerning 
freedom of speech. 
The European Court of Human Rights’ focus on the limits of expression may be 
explained by looking at the words of section 2, article 10 of the European Convention:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society. TP36PT 
 
It should be noted that the U.S. Constitution does not contain such a provision. However, 
there are limits in the U.S. approach. For example, according to the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
 
TP
31
PT  491 U.S. 397. 
TP
32
PT Id.  
TP
33
PT Id. 
TP
34
PT See Janis, supra note 3 at 158-9. 
TP
35
PT Id at 159. 
TP
36
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 2. 
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in Near v Minnesota,TP
37
PT the government has a right to prohibit “the publication of the sailing dates 
of transports or the number and location of troops”. TP
38
PT  
According to the text of the European Convention, limitations on the right of free 
expression are justified if they are for the reasons provided in the Convention. TP
39
PT Such reasons are 
 National security, territorial integrity, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, 
protection of health or morals, protection of the reputation or rights of others, prevention 
the disclosure of information received in confidence or maintaining the authority or 
impartiality of the judiciary. TP
40
PT 
 
For the European Court of Human Rights, the concept of “margin of appreciation” is the doctrine 
applicable to deciding whether or not a state’s interference with a protected right is “necessary in 
a democratic society”.TP
41
PT There are two hypotheses in this doctrine.TP
42
PT First, each state may 
construe what should be necessary in its society differently; second, the European Court of 
Human Rights can reserve judgment, to a certain degree, on issues concerning Member States.TP
43
PT  
In Handyside v. United Kingdom,TP
44
PT the Court explains the meaning of the term 
“necessary” within the scope of section 2, Article 10.TP
45
PT The Court says that “necessary” “is not 
synonymous with “indispensable”…neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as 
“admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful” or “desirable.” TP
46
PT In Handiside, the issue in front of the Court 
was whether authorities of the United Kingdom had exceeded their power by prohibiting the 
obscene publication of, and by it prosecution, of its author, Richard Handyside.TP
47
PT The Court held 
 
TP
37
PT 236 U.S. 697 (1931). 
TP
38
PT Id. at 716. 
TP
39
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 2. 
TP
40
PT Id. 
TP
41
PT See Janis, supra note 3 at 244. 
TP
42
PT Id. 
TP
43
PT Id. 
TP
44
PT Handyside v. United Kingdom, 74 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser.A)  (1976). 
TP
45
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 2. 
TP
46
PT Handyside, 74 Eur.Ct.H.R. at paras 38, 42. 
TP
47
PT Id. 
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that it is impossible to define the uniform European concept of morals.TP
48
PT  The Court held that 
national authorities are better able than international judges to understand and comprehend 
situation in their country.TP
49
PT Thus, the European Convention on Human Rights leaves Member 
States a margin of appreciationTP
50
PT.  
The European Court of Human Rights used the same rationale in its decision in Muller 
and Others v. Switzerland. TP
51
PT Josef Felix Muller was convicted under the Swiss Penal Code for 
displaying obscene materials.TP
52
PT The Court did not find any violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.TP
53
PT The Court stated that “the applicant’s conviction was 
intended to protect morals.”TP
54
PT The Court noted again that it is impossible to define a uniform 
European conception of morals and Contracting States know better whether such convictions are 
“necessary in a democratic society”.TP
55
PT  
According to the U.S. Supreme Court “the word “necessary” is…limiting the right to 
pass laws for the execution of the granted powers, to such as be indispensable.”TP
56
PT The Court also 
notices that “necessary” may have such meanings as “useful” or “essential”.TP
57
PT 
In Texas v. Johnson, TP
58
PT the Supreme Court had to decide whether it is necessary to protect 
the American flag by the limiting the freedom of speech right. Gregory Lee Johnson was 
convicted of burning an American flag in violation of the Texas Penal Code, sentenced to one 
year in prison, and fined two thousand dollars. The Supreme Court held that Johnson’s burning 
 
TP
48
PT Zaim M. Nedjati, Human Rights Under the European Convention 186 (1978). 
TP
49
PT Id. 
TP
50
PT Id. 
TP
51
PT 133 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1988). 
TP
52
PT Id.  
TP
53
PTEuropean Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10.  
TP
54
PT Muller, 133 Eur.Ct.H.R.at para 35. 
TP
55
PT Id. 
TP
56
PT M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
TP
57
PT Id. 
TP
58
PT 491 U.S. 397. 
 10
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
                                                
of the flag constituted expressive conduct of free speech.TP
59
PT The Court also held that State’s 
interest did not justify Johnson’s conviction.TP
60
PT The Court stated that “the government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”TP
61
PT 
In 1989, shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson, Congress 
passed The Flag Protection Act of 1989. TP
62
PT However, in United States v. Eichman,TP
63
PT the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld its decision in Johnson and stated that Flag Protection ActTP
64
PT violates the 
First Amendment. TP
65
PT Moreover, the Court held that the Flag Protection Act violates freedom of 
speech.  Thus, speech had preference over the State’s interest, even when a majority of people 
were against flag burning.TP
66
PT 
In Ginsberg v. New York, TP
67
PT the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting the sale 
of sexually-oriented literature to minors under the age of 17. In Handyside, TP
68
PT the European 
Court of Human Rights extended such prohibition to adults. In contrast, the Supreme Court in 
Buttler v. MichiganTP
69
PT overruled a state statute, which prohibited generally the sale of material 
unsuitable for children. The Court noted that “the incidence of this enactment is to reduce the 
adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children.”TP
70
PT  
 
TP
59
PT Id. at 406. 
TP
60
PT Id. at 412. 
TP
61
PT Id. at 406 
TP
62
PT Flag Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989). 
TP
63
PT  496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
TP
64
PT 18 U.S.C. § 700. 
TP
65
PT Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314. 
TP
66
PT Id. at 315. 
TP
67
PT 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  
TP
68
PT Handyside, 74 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser.A). 
TP
69
PT 352 U.S. 380 (1957). 
TP
70
PT Id. 
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The European Court of Human Rights gives the power to the Contracting States to decide 
whether or not it is necessary to limit particular freedom of expression in their “democratic 
society”.  Hence, the principles set in the case-law are minimum standards.TP
71
PT The U.S. Supreme 
Court strongly protects freedom of speech from limitations even in the cases when majority of 
people supports such limitation. This could be explained by a textual analysis of both major acts 
on Human Rights. Section 2, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human RightsTP
72
PT 
provides a list of circumstances when the right or freedom of expression could be limited by the 
state. The recognition of freedom of speech has a different history in the United States and 
Europe. The history of the free speech doctrine development in both areas will be discussed in 
the next part. 
2. Historical Analysis 
 
 This analysis is focused on freedom of speech recognition in Europe and the United 
States. While in the United States freedom of speech was protected centuries ago with the 
creation of the Bill of Rights, some countries in Eastern Europe recognized freedom of speech 
only in the end of the 20P
th
P century. 
In Europe, since the 17P
th
P century, there has been a struggle for the recognition of the 
freedom of expression and for removing the interference of church onto the state.TP
73
PT For example, 
in England, all published materials had to be submitted to the royal officials for approval.TP
74
PT  The 
English Bill of Rights of 1688 provided “freedom of speech”, but only in the Parliament.TP
75
PT In 
 
TP
71
PT See Michael O’Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-Law with Reference to Eastern and 
Central Europe, 8 Conn. J. Int’l L. 263, 285 (1993). 
TP
72
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 1.  
TP
73
PT See Hefferman, supra note 2 at 211. 
TP
74
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11, at 985. 
TP
75
PT Gabor Kardos, Freedom of Speech in the Time of Transition, 8 Conn. J. Int’l L. 529, 535 (1993).  
 12
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
                                                
some Eastern European countries censorship lasted until the beginning of 1990s. The fall of 
Berlin Wall in 1989 brought freedom of speech in Eastern Europe.TP
76
PT Soon after this event, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics ratified the European Convention on 
Human Rights and accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.TP
77
PT However, 
there are still such problems as the lack of an independent press and television stations, dismissal 
of the government opposition journalists, state control of the broadcasting media and censorship 
and hate speech.TP
78
PT Moreover, problems of nationalism and conflicts between different ethnic and 
cultural groups bring up other issues. TP
79
PT For example, there is a tendency to discriminate against 
minority groups by prohibiting distribution of foreign publications.TP
80
PT  
The institution of free speech and its protection is relatively new in some countries of 
central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, there are still problems of censorship and prohibitions of 
free expression arise. It will take time for a free speech tradition to become fully established. 
Thus, events since 1989 brightly illustrate that freedom of speech is a basis for a 
democratic society.TP
81
PT However, it is clear that freedom of speech does not get enough protection 
in some countries in central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, according to the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation, the Contracting States has more power than the European Court of 
Human Rights to decide what is necessary in their society. Thus, completely different results 
may be reached in cases in Europe than those in the United States. TP
82
PT  
 
TP
76
PT See Hefferman, supra note 2 at 212. 
TP
77
PT See O’Boyle, supra note 71 at  263-4. 
TP
78
PT Id. at 269. 
TP
79
PT Id. at 268-269. 
TP
80
PT See id. at 270 about Latvian policy against Russian publications.  
TP
81
PT Id. at 268. 
TP
82
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 109. 
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The Framers of the American Constitution were aware of the restriction of freedom of 
speech in England.TP
83
PT Thus, in the United States, freedom of speech was provided in the Bill of 
Rights, and since that time the Supreme Court included more and more types of “speech” in the 
protection of the First Amendment. TP
84
PT  However, the Sedition Act enacted in 1798 prohibited the 
defamation publications against the Government and the President.TP
85
PT The Act expired a few 
years later in 1801 and President Jefferson pardoned all of those convicted under the Act. TP
86
PT  
During the next century there were several efforts made to suppress “abolitionist 
literature during the slavery controversy” and “attempts to suppress seditious publications during 
the Civil War.”TP
87
PT However, freedom of speech cases first reached the Supreme Court during the 
World War I period.TP
88
PT 
In contrast to Eastern Europe, in the United States freedom of speech was recognized 
centuries ago with the creation of the Bill of Rights.TP
89
PT Nowadays, there is a great number of 
different types of speech included under the coverage of the First Amendment. 
Nevertheless, there is one type of speech, commercial speech, which has a controversial 
history in both American and European approaches and still does not receive full freedom of 
speech coverage.  
 
TP
83
PT Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 85, 96 (1999).  
TP
84
PT See Barendt, supra note 18 at 38. 
TP
85
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11, at 986. 
TP
86
PT Id. at 987. 
TP
87
PT Id. 
TP
88
PT Id. 
TP
89
PT U.S. Const. amendm. I.  
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III. VALUE OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION 
 
 This chapter is focused on the meaning of commercial speech and its interpretation by the 
courts. The research also is focused on commercial speech value, reasons and importance of 
protection.  
A. What Is Commercial Speech? 
The European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice does not provide a 
definition of commercial speech.TP
90
PT The Courts, however, have recognized that the coverage of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human RightsTP
91
PT includes to some extent “commercial 
speech”.TP
92
PT However, the term “commercial speech” is rarely used in the decisions of the Courts 
in Europe.TP
93
PT The term “information”, which is used in Article 10, can be interpreted very 
broadly.TP
94
PT It states: 
Every one shall have the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.  
 
In Markt Intern Verlag v. Germany TP
95
PT the Court held that Article 10 protects “commercial 
speech”.TP
96
PT  However, the Court did not provide any reasoning for “commercial speech” 
protection. The European Court of Human Rights stated that “such information cannot be 
 
TP
90
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 6. 
TP
91
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10. 
TP
92
PT See Hefferman, supra note 2 at 235. 
TP
93
PT Id. at 235. 
TP
94
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 1. 
TP
95
PT 164 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser.A) (1990). 
TP
96
PT Id. at para. 26. 
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excluded from the scope of Article 10(I)”.TP
97
PT If there are no reasons and no definitions mentioned, 
“one cannot be sure of the outer boundaries to the right.” TP
98
PT 
The European Court of Justice has recognized commercial speech as a part of informational 
rights and economic liberties.TP
99
PT In GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du Commerce 
Luxembourgeois,TP
100
PT although the Court did not state what is commercial speech, the Court held 
that the prohibition of advertising restricts the free movement of goods.  
The situation is different in the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court identifies categories 
of commercial speech in its cases.TP
101
PT The Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council IncTP
102
PT held that; 
(i) speech is not “commercial” merely because money is spent to project it; (ii) speech is 
not “commercial” merely because it is carried in a form that is “sold” for profit; (iii) 
speech is not “commercial” merely because it may involve a solicitation to purchase or 
otherwise pay and contribute money.TP
103
PT 
 
The Court also noted three characteristics of commercial speech. Commercial speech is 
speech that is “concededly an advertisement refers to a specific product and is motivated by 
economic interest”.TP
104
PT In Pittsburgh Press Company v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human 
RelationsTP
105
PT the U.S. Supreme Court gives a definition of commercial speech as speech that does 
“no more than propose a commercial transaction.” TP
106
PT  
 
TP
97
PT Id. 
TP
98
PT  See Hefferman, supra note 2 at 236.  
TP
99
PT Id. at 239. 
TP
100
PT Case 362/88, 1990 E.C.R.I-667, (1990).  
TP
101
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 6-7. 
TP
102
PT  425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
TP
103
PT Id. at 761. 
TP
104
PT Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wall Street Publishing Institute Inc. dba Stock Market Magazine 851 F 
2d 365 (USCA DC Cir 1988) at 372. 
TP
105
PT 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
TP
106
PT Id. at 385. 
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The Court also defined in its cases what commercial speech does not consist of.TP
107
PT It is 
not a speech on commercial subject;TP
108
PT it is not a speech “in a form sold for profit;”TP
109
PT it is not a 
speech that seeks moneyTP
110
PT and it is not an element of commercial speech when money is spent 
to financial project.TP
111
PT 
Thus, almost in most cases that U.S. Supreme Court reviewed concerning commercial 
speech protection, the subject included “advertising, promoting or soliciting for business.”TP
112
PT The 
only exception was the Coors caseTP
113
PT, a case related to product labeling, which is not that far 
from product advertising. TP
114
PT Nowadays, in the United States commercial speech is “speech that 
companies use to sell their products to the public.” TP
115
PT 
The European Court of Human Right has a different practice. TP
116
PT The Court considers 
consumer criticism and magazine articles on product safety as presumed commercial 
expression.TP
117
PT  Again, the European Court of Human Rights does not offer any rationale for such 
decisions.TP
118
PT 
The recent practice of the U.S. Supreme Court broadly interprets commercial speech as 
speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction”TP
119
PT  and as cases which are 
 
TP
107
PT Alex Kozinski, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 638 (1990). 
TP
108
PT Virginia State Board of pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62. 
TP
109
PT Id. at 761; see also Kozinski, supra note 107 at 638. 
TP
110
PT Virginia State Board of pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. 
TP
111
PT Id. 
TP
112
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 7-8. 
TP
113
PT Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company 514 U.S 476 (1995). 
TP
114
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 8. 
TP
115
PT Roger Parloff, Can We Talk? A Shocking  First Amendment Ruling Against Nike Radically Reduces the Rights to 
Corporations to Speak Their Minds. Will the Supreme Court Let it Stand?, Fortune, Sept. 2, 2002 at 108. 
TP
116
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 8. 
TP
117
PT Id. 
TP
118
PT Id. at 6. 
TP
119
PT Pittsburg Press Company, 413 U.S. at 385. 
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“more complicated than simple cases of informational advertising.”TP
120
PT However, for a long time, 
commercial speech protection did not exist in the United States. 
B. Why Should Commercial Speech Be Protected? 
Importance of commercial speech protection might not be so obvious as the importance of 
the protection of political speech or artistic expression. However, several reasons exist why 
commercial speech should not only be protected, but also should get the full level of protection.  
First of all, commercial speech is a basic of element a free market.TP
121
PT Effective operation of 
the market would be impossible without freedom of information.TP
122
PT There is a public interest “to 
preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy” and in a “flow of commercial 
information.”TP
123
PT It is obvious that commercial speech benefits not only individuals, but also 
society. Furthermore, commercial speech benefits not only producers, but also consumers 
because advertising provides them not only with freedom of information, but also with freedom 
of choice. 
According to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the right to impart 
information is a part of the freedom of speech. TP
124
PT Thus, it is puzzling why commercial speech 
does not receive full protection, and in some cases receives no protection. As it was mentioned in 
the first chapter, freedom of speech is one of the main conditions for one’s self-realization, as 
well as an instrument for achieving different social objectives.TP
125
PT Furthermore, it is undisputable 
that truthful and not misleading advertising provides one with useful knowledge about certain 
product. It is also evident that advertisement helps consumers to find truthful information. 
 
TP
120
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 8. 
TP
121
PT See, supra, Chapter I. 
TP
122
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 114. 
TP
123
PT Virginia State Board of pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
TP
124
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 1.  
TP
125
PT See also Shiner, supra note 12 at 125. 
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What about self-realization and self-fulfillment? The possibility to make economic choices is 
“an important aspect of individual self-realization.”TP
126
PT Economic choices help consumers to 
choose the right product and to buy this product for the best price. However, there is a point of 
view that the possibility to make economic choices allows the hearer or receiver of information 
to achieve self realization, but does not do so for the speaker.TP
127
PT However, advertisement is the 
best way for self-realization of the speaker, too. By advertising her products or services, a person 
gets a chance self-realization in business and in life.  
Freedom of commercial expression should not be absolute since false and misleading 
advertisement should be restricted. The limits on advertisement of dangerous products, like 
cigarettes or alcohol, seems reasonable. However, courts should be very careful in upholding 
prohibitions and restrictions on commercial speech.  
The next chapter will focus on commercial speech protection in the United States. 
Commercial speech in the United States came a long way from a complete denial of its 
protection under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to an acknowledgment of its need 
for protection and to receiving an intermediate level of protection. 
 
 
 
 
TP
126
PT Attorney General of Quebec v. La Chaussure Brown’s Inc et al, 54 D.L.R. (4Pth P) 577, 618 (1988). 
TP
127
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 238. 
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IV. COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
The development of commercial speech protection will be discussed in this chapter. The 
historical analysis shows that commercial speech was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court 
only in 1976. Commercial speech still does not receive the full protection from the Court, 
however the intermediate level of protection has became a standard. 
A. Commercial Speech and Its Protection Before 1976 
In the United States constitutional protection for freedom of speech is based on the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. TP
128
PT The Amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievance. TP
129
PT 
 
Most of the commentators suggest that the First Amendment did not cover commercial 
speech in the United States for a long time.TP
130
PT However, some commentators contend that there 
is evidence suggesting that commercial speech was protected.TP
131
PT Although there were no 
restrictions on some types of advertising, some states tried to regulate advertisement of doctors 
and attorneys, merchants and shopkeepers.TP
132
PT Some states also prohibited lotteries and their 
advertisement and promotion.TP
133
PT The U.S. Supreme Court did not decide any commercial speech 
 
TP
128
PT U.S. Const. amendm. I.  
TP
129
PT Id. 
TP
130
PT See Barendt, supra note 19 at 54 (1985); see also Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1158-9. 
TP
131
PT See Troy, supra note 83 at 109. 
TP
132
PT Id. at 104. 
TP
133
PTSee  id. at 105. 
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law cases before the Civil War. TP
134
PT In the post Civil War period, the U.S. Supreme Court left 
almost all types of commercial speech outside the First Amendment.TP
135
PT For example, in Ex parte 
JacksonTP
136
PT the Court sustained the Congress ban on the advertising of lotteries by mail. Taking 
the opposite point of view, Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner suggest that the Court “considered 
advertising (or at least printed circulars advertising lotteries) to be speech entitled to the same 
degree of First Amendment protection as any other.”TP
137
PT The first case in front of the U.S. 
Supreme Court dealing with the issue of whether or not the First Amendment protects 
advertising was the 1942 case of Valentine v. Christensen.TP
138
PT  
1. Valentine v. Christensen and commercial speech doctrine. 
 
In Valentine v. Christensen, the Supreme Court sustained a New York City ordinance that 
prohibited commercial and business advertising materials on the streets.TP
139
PT Christensen owned a 
submarine, which he kept at a pier owned by the state of New York, in order to make money 
from it as a tourist attraction.TP
140
PT He printed advertising handbills and had the intent to distribute 
them. TP
141
PT However the police stopped the distribution because it violated a city ordinance 
prohibiting commercial advertising involving distribution on the streets.TP
142
PT Christensen reprinted 
his handbills advertising the exhibit without reference to a price and another side contained a 
protest against the city for not allowing him to keep his submarine at a city dock. TP
143
PT This 
 
TP
134
PT Id. at 113. 
TP
135
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1159. 
TP
136
PT 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
TP
137
PT Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex.L.Rev. 747, 
765 (1993). 
TP
138
PT  316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
TP
139
PT Id. at . 53. 
TP
140
PT Id.  
TP
141
PT Id. 
TP
142
PT Id. 
TP
143
PT Id. 
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distribution was also stopped by the city police.TP
144
PT Handbill prohibitions were at that time 
uncommon. TP
145
PT 
The Supreme Court held that “the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government 
in respect to purely commercial advertising.”TP
146
PT The Court held that the prohibition regulated an 
economic activity, rather than infringing on protected political speech.TP
147
PT Alex Kozinski noticed 
that the commercial speech doctrine was born when the Court did not cite any authority in its 
opinion.TP
148
PT ValentineTP
149
PT seemed to completely delete commercial speech from the First 
Amendment protection list. 
However, the Court’s decision in ValentineTP
150
PT “did not mean that First Amendment 
Protection was barred simply because the speaker had a commercial motive.”TP
151
PT In Thomas v 
CollinsTP
152
PT the Court held that “the idea is not sound, therefore that the First Amendment’s 
safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or economic activity.”TP
153
PT 
In New York Times v. SullivanTP
154
PT the Supreme Court accepted that the First Amendment 
applies to a “paid ‘commercial advertisement”.TP
155
PT Nevertheless, the Court’s decisions in the 
cases after ValentineTP
156
PT were based mostly on “commercial-noncommercial distinction.”TP
157
PT In the 
 
TP
144
PT Id. 
TP
145
PT Shiner, supra note 12 at 27. 
TP
146
PT Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. 
TP
147
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1159. 
TP
148
PT Kozinski, supra note 107 at 628. 
TP
149
PT 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
TP
150
PT Id. 
TP
151
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1159. 
TP
152
PT 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
TP
153
PT Id. at 531. 
TP
154
PT 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
TP
155
PT Id., see also Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1159. 
TP
156
PT 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
TP
157
PT Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1159. 
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early 1970s in Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations CommissionTP
158
PT the Supreme 
Court came back to its Valentine’s TP
159
PTcommercial speech doctrine. 
2. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission 
 
In Pittsburgh Press,TP
160
PT the Supreme Court upheld the city of Pittsburgh ordinance against sex 
discrimination in the newspapers. The Pittsburgh Press newspaper separated employment 
advertisement into “Male Help Wanted” and “Female Help Wanted”.TP
161
PT The city found such 
advertisements in violation of its ordinance.TP
162
PT Justice Powell’s majority opinion followed 
“Christensen rather than the [New York Times] advertisement”TP
163
PT and found that “discrimination 
in employment is not only a commercial activity; it is illegal commercial activity under the 
Ordinance.”TP
164
PT  Even when there is sex discrimination, is “the issue is a sensitive one”TP
165
PT and the 
Court said it is “no more than a proposal of possible employment”.TP
166
PT The Court concluded: “The 
advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech,” which are not covered by the 
First Amendment. TP
167
PT 
Two years after the decision in Pittsburgh Press the U.S. Supreme Court changed its route. 
3. Bigelow v. Virginia 
The issue in Bigelow v. VirginiaTP
168
PT was whether or not Virginia could criminalize 
advertisement in Virginia newspapers of the availability of abortions in New York.TP
169
PT Jeffrey 
 
TP
158
PT 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
TP
159
PT 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
TP
160
PT 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
TP
161
PT Id. at 379. 
TP
162
PT Id. at 378-9. 
TP
163
PT Id. at 385. 
TP
164
PT Id. at 388. 
TP
165
PT Id. at 378. 
TP
166
PT Id. at 385. 
TP
167
PT Id.  
TP
168
PT 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
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Bigelow put in the paper an advertisement about the legality of abortions in the state of New 
York and the possibility for out-of-state women to get abortions in New York clinics. TP
170
PT He was 
convicted under a Virginia law for encouraging the procurement of an abortion.TP
171
PT Bigelow 
challenged the Virginia statute as a violation of his First Amendments rights.TP
172
PT The state of 
Virginia relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Valentine.TP
173
PT  The U.S. Supreme Court stated 
that the commercial character of speech does not automatically omit it from First Amendment 
protection.TP
174
PT The Court also narrowed the scope of Valentine to the manner of distribution of 
commercial advertising. TP
175
PT The Court reconsidered Valentine’s theory that commercial 
advertisement is always unprotected.TP
176
PT However, the Court stated again: “We need not decide in 
this case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that 
is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit.”TP
177
PT  
The Supreme Court started to change the commercial speech doctrine in Bigelow. One year 
after this decision, in Virginia PharmacyTP
178
PT the Court stated that “the notion of unprotected 
‘commercial speech’ all but passed from the scene.” TP
179
PT 
 
TP
169
PT Id. 
TP
170
PT Id. 
TP
171
PT Id. 
TP
172
PT Id. 
TP
173
PT 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
TP
174
PT Bigelow., 421 U.S. at 819. 
TP
175
PT Id. 
TP
176
PT Id. at 820. 
TP
177
PT Id. at 825. 
TP
178
PT 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
TP
179
PT Id. at  759. 
 24
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
                                                
B. Commercial speech and its protection after 1976 
1. Virginia State Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. Declaring  Commercial 
Speech Protection 
In 1976 commercial speech was finally recognized by the Supreme Court in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy. TP
180
PT Consumers of prescription drugs brought suit against the Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy. TP
181
PT They were challenging the validity of a Virginia statute declaring it 
unprofessional for a pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs.TP
182
PT The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that “commercial speech” is not wholly 
outside the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”TP
183
PT The Supreme Court affirmed 
this decision. Justice Blackmun delivered the Court’s opinion.TP
184
PT The Court held that 
“commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected” but “some forms of commercial speech 
are surely permissible.”TP
185
PT Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated the reasons for 
commercial speech protection: 
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our 
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It 
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well 
informed. To this end the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. TP
186
PT 
 
 The Court analyzed its previous decisions in Pittsburgh PressTP
187
PT, NY TimesTP
188
PT, SmithTP
189
PT, 
BurstynTP
190
PT, MurdockTP
191
PT, JamisonTP
192
PT and CantwellTP
193
PT and concluded that First Amendment 
 
TP
180
PT Id. 
TP
181
PT Id. at 748. 
TP
182
PT Id. 
TP
183
PT Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.. v. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy et all, 373 F.Supp 683 (1975). 
TP
184
PT Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749. 
TP
185
PT Id. at 770. 
TP
186
PT Id. at 765. 
TP
187
PT 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
TP
188
PT  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
TP
189
PT Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
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protected such kind of speech when money were spent on the  project; when speech is in a form 
that is sold for profit;  and when speech involves solicitation to purchase or pay and contribute 
money. TP
194
PT The Court concluded that commercial speech does not differ from other forms of 
speech and should also be protected.TP
195
PT For example, political speech is protected because there 
is a citizens’ interest involved.   The Court noted that there is also a consumer’s interest in the 
free flow of commercial information. TP
196
PT The Court also analogized to the protection extended to 
labor relations where the speech was directed to the promotion of speaker’s economic self-
interest. Advertisement is also directed to the promotion of the speaker’s economic self-
interest.TP
197
PT 
Furthermore, the Court noticed that it is important to trust such professionals as 
pharmacists.TP
198
PT Virginia Pharmacy case raised the question of the professional advertisement. 
However, the Court noted that its decision does not generally apply to all other professions. The 
Court stated that physicians and lawyers might be treated differently.TP
199
PT  
In a later case, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,TP
200
PT the Court struck down the state of 
Arizona’s prohibition on attorneys’ advertising. The Court repeated its determination to protect 
commercial speech. Fred S. McChesney noticed that the Court’s decision in Bates achieved the 
 
TP
190
PT Joseph Burstyn Inc. v Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).  
TP
191
PT Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
TP
192
PT Jamison v Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). 
TP
193
PT Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
TP
194
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 38. 
TP
195
PT Id. 
TP
196
PT Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763. 
TP
197
PT Id. at 762-3; see also Shiner, supra note 12 at 39. 
TP
198
PT Id. at 766-70. 
TP
199
PT Id. at 773, n.25. 
TP
200
PT 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 26
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
                                                
highest point of economic analysis and since that case, the quality of the Court’s economic 
analysis has declined.TP
201
PT  
In Ohralic v Ohio State Bar AssociationTP
202
PT the Court distinguished commercial in-person 
legal solicitation from published legal commercial advertising.TP
203
PT The Court held that the first 
type – in-person-solicitation could be restrained.TP
204
PT The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
commercial speech may get “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate 
position in the First Amendment scale of values.”TP
205
PT In Primus,TP
206
PT however, the Court permitted 
solicitation by mail. However, the Court probably protected this kind of speech because this case 
involves political speech and the civil liberties because Ms Primus was employed by the 
American Civil Liberties Union.TP
207
PT  
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized commercial speech and its protection under the First 
Amendment. However, the Court does not wish to give commercial speech the full protection.TP
208
PT  
A few years after its decision in Virginia Board the Court faced commercial speech again 
in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York.TP
209
PT The Supreme Court’s 
decision in this case established the modern American approach to freedom of commercial 
speech.TP
210
PT 
 
TP
201
PT Fred S. McChesney, “De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court’s Latest Commercial Speech Cases”, 
Supreme Court Economic Review 5 (1997) at 81-139. 
TP
202
PT 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
TP
203
PT Id. at 455. 
TP
204
PT Id. 
TP
205
PT Id.  
TP
206
PT In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
TP
207
PT Id., see also Shiner, supra note 12 at 52. 
TP
208
PT See id. at 53. 
TP
209
PT 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
TP
210
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 53. 
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2. Central Hudson and modern commercial speech regulation 
In Central Hudson an electrical utility brought suit in New York State court to challenge 
the constitutionality of a regulation of the New York Public Service Commission which 
completely banned promotional advertising by a utility.TP
211
PT Justice Powell delivered the opinion 
for the Supreme Court: 
Though the state of New York had a legitimate interest in energy conservation and 
though that interest was directly advanced by the Commission's order, the Commission's 
complete suppression of speech ordinarily protected by the First Amendment was more 
extensive than necessary to further the state's interest in conservation and thus violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. TP
212
PT 
 
The Court gave new meaning to commercial speech. Here, it is an “expression related 
solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience.”TP
213
PT Also, the Court stated that 
“the First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of 
advertising.”TP
214
PT The Court applied a “four-part” analysis to determine whether or not the 
commercial speech would not be protected: 
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. TP
215
PT 
 
False and fraudulent statements are not protected. The following parts of the test are 
similar to the European doctrine of “margin of appreciation”. TP
216
PT Just like the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Supreme Court stated that it is important to determine if the governmental 
(state’s) interest could justify the limitations on commercial speech. Again, the commercial 
 
TP
211
PT Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 557. 
TP
212
PT Id. 
TP
213
PT Id. at 561. 
TP
214
PT Id. at 563. 
TP
215
PT Id. at 566. 
TP
216
PT See supra Chapter II.B. 
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speech would not be protected if “it is necessary in a democratic society’”TP
217
PT to restrict such 
speech. 
The Court used its test in later cases. However, in each new case the Supreme Court 
interpreted its Central Hudson test in a new way. For example in Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Associates dba Condado Holiday Inn v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico et al,TP
218
PT the Supreme 
Court focused on the third part of the test.TP
219
PT The court upheld a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
statute, which prohibited all advertising of gambling in Puerto-Rico.  The Court stated that such 
advertisement may increase public interest in gambling, and moreover, the Court thinks “it is up 
to the legislature to decide whether or not a “counter speech” policy would be as effective in 
reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising.” TP
220
PT  
Again, similar to the European Court of Human Rights, the U.S. Supreme Court leaves 
power to decide whether or not commercial speech should be restricted to the state.  
However, in City of Cincinnati v Discovery Network Inc et alTP
221
PT the Court started to 
require the government to show concrete evidence that the restriction of commercial speech 
would directly advance the stated interest. Moreover, the Court held that commercial speech can 
not be treated differently from non-commercial speech.TP
222
PT The Court invalidated the city 
ordinance prohibition on distributing "commercial handbills" on public property.TP
223
PT 
However, in United States v Edge Broadcasting Company the Court held:  
Federal statutes prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertising by broadcaster licensed to 
state that does not allow lotteries, while allowing such broadcasting by broadcaster licensed 
 
TP
217
PT European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 10, art.10 § 2. 
TP
218
PT 478 U.S. 328 (1986).  
TP
219
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 56. 
TP
220
PT Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344. 
TP
221
PT 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
TP
222
PT Id. 
TP
223
PT Id. 
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to state that supports lottery, regulated commercial speech in manner that did not violate 
First Amendment, as applied to broadcaster located in nonlottery state but near border of 
lottery state. 
 
The Court stated that such prohibition directly advanced the state’s interest.TP
224
PT 
In Board of Trustees, State Univ. of New York v. Fox TP
225
PT the Supreme Court stated that to 
satisfy the fourth part of Central Hudson analysis, “the governmental restrictions upon 
commercial speech need not be the absolute least restrictive means to achieve desired end.”TP
226
PT 
Thus, commonly the Court does not protect commercial speech in cases where the government 
proved that its interest is extremely high. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fox shows that 
commercial speech still does not receive the full protection. 
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode IslandTP
227
PT deserves special attention. The Court held that the 
Rhode’s Island total ban on liquor prices advertisement was unconstitutional.TP
228
PT The Supreme 
Court used Central Hudson test again, and held that the statute does not meet the fourth part 
requirement. TP
229
PT The government might use other methods, such as establishing a minimum price 
or increasing sales taxes to achieve its goal of decreasing sale of alcoholic beverages.TP
230
PT In this 
case Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Thomas recognized strict scrutiny for some kinds 
of commercial speech regulations.TP
231
PT However, the majority of the Court has never admitted 
strict scrutiny for commercial speech.TP
232
PT 
 
TP
224
PT Id. at 428. 
TP
225
PT 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
TP
226
PT Id.  
TP
227
PT 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
TP
228
PT Id. 
TP
229
PT Id. at 487. 
TP
230
PT Id. 
TP
231
PT See Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 11 at 1186 
TP
232
PT Id. 
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Thus, the Court established a higher degree of scrutiny in 44 Liquormart than in Fox or 
Posadas. The Court now requires the government to forge a link between its substantial interest 
and possible methods for achieving this interest. 
3. Commercial speech in the most recent cases. Intermediate Standard of Scrutiny 
In a recent case, the Supreme Court still applied the Central Hudson test. For example in 
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association Inc. v. United StatesTP
233
PT the Supreme Court held 
that prohibition on broadcasting lottery information could not be applied to advertisements of 
lawful private casino gambling. The Court noticed that the government’s interest did not satisfy 
the third and fourth parts of the Central Hudson test.TP
234
PT  
However, in Glickman v Wileman Bros., TP
235
PT the Court did not apply the Central Hudson test. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court decided not to implicate freedom of speech. In this case, fruit 
producers challenged assessments to pay for generic advertising under marketing orders issued 
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.TP
236
PT The Court 
found that mandatory fees did not violate the First Amendment. TP
237
PT However, in his dissent, 
Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia applied the Central Hudson test and 
found that government’s regulation does not meet the requirements of the test.TP
238
PT 
In United States v United Foods Inc. TP
239
PT the same issue arose. This time the Court invalidated 
the same scheme. However, the Court distinguished this case from Glickman. The main 
distinction was that the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive 
 
TP
233
PT 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
TP
234
PT Id. at 174. 
TP
235
PT 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
TP
236
PT Id. 
TP
237
PT Id. 
TP
238
PT Id. at 499. 
TP
239
PT 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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statutory agricultural marketing program as in Glickman. TP
240
PT The Court did not apply the Central 
Hudson test even when commercial speech was involved. Instead of that, the Supreme Court 
held that the issue belongs to the doctrine of compelled speech.TP
241
PT  
In Thompson v Western States Medical Center,TP
242
PT licensed pharmacies brought an action 
challenging provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 
1997 that prohibited advertising and promotion of particular compounded drugs. The 
government stated that there were three substantial interests to adopt the FDAMA: protection of 
the public health; “preserving the availability of compounded drugs for those individual patients 
who cannot use commercially available products” and achieving the proper balance between the 
previous two interests.TP
243
PT The Supreme Court held that “provisions were unconstitutional 
restrictions of commercial speech.”TP
244
PT However, the Court again applied the Central Hudson test 
and held that “the Government has failed to demonstrate that the speech restrictions are ‘not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interest[s]” and “the Government can achieve 
its interest in a manner that does not restrict commercial speech.”TP
245
PT  For example, the 
government “could prohibit pharmacist from compounding more drugs in anticipation of 
receiving prescriptions” or sale drug products for resale.TP
246
PT Justice Breyer, in dissent, noticed that 
the issue in this case concerned public health, and not freedom of speech.TP
247
PT However, both 
 
TP
240
PT Id. 
TP
241
PT Id. at 408. 
TP
242
PT 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
TP
243
PT Id. at 368 
TP
244
PT Id.at 405. 
TP
245
PT Id. at 358; see also Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566. 
TP
246
PT Id. at 372. 
TP
247
PT Id. at 389. 
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parties in the case agreed that “advertising and soliciting prohibited by FDAMA constitute 
commercial speech.”TP
248
PT 
A new question arises whether the state can ever succeed if lawful and not misleading 
commercial speech is involved in the case. In Anderson v Treadwell,TP
249
PT the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit applied the Central Hudson test and upheld New York’s restriction on in-
home real estate advertisements. The Court held that even when prohibited advertisement is 
unlawful and misleading commercial speech, the State’s interest in protecting neighborhoods and 
the privacy of homeowners “from blockbusting and harassing in-home real estate solicitations” is 
substantial.TP
250
PT The U.S. Supreme Court denied petition for writ of certiorari.TP
251
PT  
Thus, the commercial speech protection has a long and controversial history in the United 
States. Nowadays, commercial speech in the United States is “an established constitutional 
right.”TP
252
PT Commercial speech still does not receive the full protection from the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court will probably uphold restrictions on commercial speech protection if 
the State has a substantial interest according to the Central Hudson test. However, an 
intermediate level of protection for commercial speech has become standard.TP
253
PT  
 
TP
248
PT Id. at 366. 
TP
249
PT 294 F.3d 453 (2002). 
TP
250
PT Id. at 461. 
TP
251
PT Anderson v. Treadwell, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). 
TP
252
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 69. 
TP
253
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 69. 
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V. COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN EUROPE 
There is no common constitution in Europe and all the European countries are independent, 
sovereign states. Thus, it is important to analyze decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights and European Court of Justice to be able to understand the common principles of 
commercial speech protection within Europe. The analysis illustrates that both European Courts 
recognized commercial speech protection, but on practice they simply do not protect it in their 
decisions.  
A. Case Law 
1. European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights is the main judicial institution of the Council of 
Europe. It is based in Strasbourg and includes judges from Member States which signed the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
The European Commission on Human Rights, which until 1998 was accepting 
applications and heard cases under the Convention, recognized commercial expression and its 
protection under Article 10 in 1979.TP
254
PT In Church of Scientology v. SwedenTP255PT the European 
Commission held that the Swedish Marketing Improper Practices Act of 1970, which prohibited 
commercial advertisement of the scientologists’ material, violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
TP
254
PT Id. at 96. 
TP
255
PT 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec & Rep. 68 (1979). 
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However, it was mentioned that the level of protection of commercial expression must be less 
than that of political speech protection.TP
256
PT 
For example, in Barthold v. Germany, TP
257
PT the European Commission held that the case did 
not concern commercial speech, but rather public discussion. Barthold had the only emergency 
veterinary clinic in Hamburg. During an interview with one of the local newspapers, Barthold 
mentioned that fact and also said that his clinic is open for business. He was sanctioned in the 
German court for violations Germany’s Unfair Competition Act, which applied to professional 
advertising.TP
258
PT The Commission holds that Barthold’s speech was indeed public discussion and 
his rights had been violated. 
Another case that concerned The German Unfair Competition Act was Markt Intern 
Verlag v. Germany. TP
259
PT The applicant in this case was a small publishing firm from Düsseldorf 
distributed bulletins accusing big mail-order firm of not paying reimbursement to consumers.260 
Such publications were prohibited under the Act. When this case reached the European Court of 
Human Rights, it held that the bulletins “conveyed information of a commercial nature” and such 
information cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 10(1) which does not apply solely to 
certain information or ideas of forms of expression”.TP
261
PT  However, the Court noted that “the 
statements made "for purposes of competition" fell outside the basic nucleus protected by the 
freedom of expression and received a lower level of protection than other "ideas" or 
"information".TP
262 
PT he Court held by ten votes to nine with the decisive casting vote of the 
 
TP
256
PT Id. at 73. 
TP
257
PT 90 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1985). 
TP
258
PT Id. 
TP
259
PT 133 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
TP
260
PT Id. 
TP
261
PT Id. at para 26. 
TP
262
PT Id. at para 32. 
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President that there had been no violation of Article 10. Again, the Court based its decision on 
the concept of “margin of appreciation” and left the German Federal Court of Justice to decide 
whether such limit is necessary in a democratic society. The Court did not provide any reasoning 
for why the coverage of the Article 10 should be extended to the commercial speech but not in 
this case.TP
263
PT  
Another case involving commercial speech, which involved German Unfair Competition 
Act was Jacubowski v Germany.TP
264
PT The Court stated that the case concerned commercial speech 
and again held that there was no violation of Article 10.TP
265
PT 
A large number of cases, which involved commercial speech and professional 
advertisement in particular, reached The European Court of Human Rights. However, the Court 
kept recognizing commercial speech and finding no violation of the Article 10.TP
266
PT  
In contrast, in a recent case, Stambuck v Germany,TP
267
PT the Court reversed the Stuttgart 
Disciplinary Appeals Court’s decision and protected commercial speech. In this case, Stambuck, 
an ophthalmologist, was interviewed by a local newspaper about his new laser surgery method. 
The lower court had found that this kind of advertisement and co-operation with the press 
violated German Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Why did the Court protect commercial speech in this case and find no violation in other 
cases? In Stambuck, the main purpose of the Court was to protect the freedom of press but not 
 
TP
263
PT See Hefferman, supra note 2 at 236. 
TP
264
PT 291-A Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
TP
265
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 99. 
TP
266
PT See, e.g. Colman v UK, 258-D Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Casado Coca v Spain, 285-A Eur.Ct.H.R. 
(ser.A)(1994). 
TP
267
PT Stambuck v Germany, 37928/97 Eur.Ct.H.R. (2002). 
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commercial speech. The Court noticed that the article was not commercial and that protecting 
freedom of speech is more important than restricting advertisement.TP
268
PT  
In 2001, an interesting and controversial case reached the European Court of Human 
Rights. In Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland,TP
269
PT the Plaintiff, an organization of animal 
rights activists, wanted to show a program on Swiss television concerning the awful conditions 
in which animals raised for food are living. Such a film was prohibited under the Swiss Federal 
Radio and Television as a film with “clear political character”.TP
270
PT Verein gegen Tiefabriken was 
arguing that its film is commercial advertisement; made as a counter-argument to the 
advertisements of the beef industry.TP
271
PT The Court found for the Plaintiff. However, the Plaintiff’s 
rights were protected not on the basis of commercial speech protection but as a freedom of 
political discussion.TP
272
PT  
Thus, though European Court of Human Right has recognized commercial speech 
protection, the Court does not want to protect purely commercial expression. In all cases where 
the expression was related only to advertisement like in Markt InternTP
273
PT, ColmanTP
274
PT and 
JacubowskiTP
275
PT, the Court did not find any violations of the Article 10.TP
276
PT However, when there 
were other rights involved and the expression involved “as much political as commercial”TP
277
PT the 
Court protected such expression. For example, in BartholdTP
278
PT and Verein gegen TierfabrikenTP
279
PT 
 
TP
268
PT Id.; see also Shiner, supra note 12 at 99. 
TP
269
PT 24699/94 EurCt.H.R. (2001). 
TP
270
PT Id. at para. 11. 
TP
271
PT Id. at para. 69. 
TP
272
PT Id. at paras. 57, 79. 
TP
273
PT 133 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
TP
274
PT 258-D Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
TP
275
PT 291-A Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
TP
276
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 106-7. 
TP
277
PT Id. at 107. 
TP
278
PT 90 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1985). 
TP
279
PT 24699/94 EurCt.H.R. (2001). 
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the Court found violation of freedom of expression under Article 10. However, in both cases the 
expressions concerned political discussion and debates rather than commercial speech. In 
Stambuck,TP
280
PT the Court was concerned about freedom of press protection.  
Therefore, purely commercial speech “inciting the public to purchase a particular 
product”TP
281
PT is not protected by the European Court of Human Rights.TP
282
PT The concept of “margin 
of appreciation” plays a great role in the European Court of Human Rights decisions in 
commercial speech cases. In Markt Intern, the Court stated that “a margin of appreciation 
appears essential in commercial matters.”TP
283
PT The Court included advertisement in this conception 
in Casado Coca v Spain.TP
284
PT   
It is worth mentioning that Contracting Members are independent states. Thus, the 
European Court of Human Rights cannot overrule judgments of independent governments as the 
U.S. Supreme Court can overrule acts of the states’ governments. TP
285
PT However, in these cases 
when political speech is involved, the Court does not give any discretion to the Contracting 
Members.  
According to Mark W. Janis and Roger A. Shiner, there are few reasons why commercial 
expressions do not get any protection in contrast to political expressions. First, restrictions on 
commercial speech are generally regarded as less of a threat to human rights than those on 
political speech.TP
286
PT Secondly, there is an argument that there is a practice established “of 
economic regulation which necessarily includes restriction of speech related to economic 
 
TP
280
PT Stambuck v Germany, 37928/97 Eur.Ct.H.R. (2002). 
TP
281
PT Verein gegen Tierfabriken, 24699/94 EurCt.H.R. para. 11. 
TP
282
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 106-107. 
TP
283
PT 133 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) at para. 33. 
TP
284
PT 285-A Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser.A) at para. 55. 
TP
285
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 109. 
TP
286
PT Janis, supra note 3 at 206. 
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transactions.” TP
287
PT Nonetheless, questions tend to arise. Why did the European Court of Human 
Rights declare the protection of commercial speech under Article 10 of the European 
Convention? Why does it refuse to protect purely commercial speech at all?  As it was 
mentioned before, The European Court of Human Rights did not provide any explanation as to 
what is commercial speech and what kind of speech should be protected.   
It is important to analyze The European Court of Justice’s decision on related matters to 
understand the full picture of commercial speech protection in Europe.   
2. European Court of Justice 
 The European Court of Justice is the main judicial body of the European Union. The 
Court is responsible for the settlement of litigation arising out of legislation of the European 
Union’s law-making institutions.TP
288
PT  
The protection of economic freedoms is one of the basic elements of the European Union 
just as the creation of the common marketplace was one of the main purposes for the European 
Community. TP
289
PT Thus, it is difficult to understand why such a system does not provide 
informational rights and allows the common regulation of commercial information. TP
290
PT  
 Hence, the European Court of Justice held that “the Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection and Fundamental 
Freedoms.” TP
291
PT  In relation to commercial speech protection, the Court does not talk about 
producers’ rights but consumer’s rights’. In GB-INNO-BM v. Confederation du Commerce 
 
TP
287
PT Id. 
TP
288
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 94.  
TP
289
PT See Hefferman, supra note 2 at 239. 
TP
290
PT Id. 
TP
291
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 100-1. 
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Luxembourgeois,TP
292
PT the Court held that consumers from one “Member State must be able to enter 
freely into another Member State and make purchases under the same conditions as the local 
population….and that right was curtailed when consumers were denied access to advertising 
material available in the country of purchase.”TP
293
PT 
 However, The European Court of Justice does not focus on commercial speech issues 
from the producer’s point of view. In the large number of cases dealing with the issues of trade- 
mark protection and product-labeling restrictions, the European Court of Justice, in contrast to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, does not give any suggestions that “the value of freedom of speech 
bears on their resolution.”TP
294
PT   
 The commercial speech question was raised after the Directive 98/43/EC, which 
prohibited all tobacco advertisement, was issued by the European Parliament and Council. The 
European Court of Justice, after complaints from Germany and Great Britain, annulled the 
Directive.TP
295
PT 
 Besides the tobacco cases, the commercial expression issue was raised in a few other 
cases that reached European Court of Justice. For example in Konsumentombudsmannen v. 
Gourmet International Products AktiebolagTP
296
PT the publishers of food and drink magazine 
Gourmet challenged a Swedish ban on the advertisement of spirits, wines and strong beers in 
magazines. The Court held that the Swedish restrictions did not violate trade regulations of the 
European Union since there were no other measures available to protect public health against the 
harmful effects of alcohol. However, the commercial speech issue was not raised again. 
 
TP
292
PT Case 362/88, 1990 E.C.R.I-667, (1990). 
TP
293
PT Id. 
TP
294
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 101. 
TP
295
PT Case C-376/98, Germany, 1998 E.C.R. I-8419; see also, infra, Chapter V, Part III about tobacco advertisement in 
Europe and the United States. 
TP
296
PT Case C-405/98, 1998 E.C.R. I-1795 (1998). 
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 In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan,TP
297
PT the Society for the 
Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) sought an injunction against a group of Dublin college 
students to prevent the group from publishing abortion information in its annual student guide. 
The European Court of Justice found that the law against publishing abortion information did not 
violate Article 10(1) of the Convention. However, the Court noted that this decision concerned 
only students and not professional clinics.TP
298
PT Later, the European Court of Human Rights found a 
violation of the freedom of speech in a similar case. TP
299
PT 
 Most of the cases involved the European Union Directive which contained bans on 
tobacco advertisement. The Court found violations of the freedom of speech and annulled the 
Directive. However, a great role in the Court’s decision turned on the fact that Member States 
were against the ban because in every commercial speech case the courts leave much discretion 
to Member States. Otherwise, the Court would likely, on the basis of the “margin of 
appreciation” doctrine, uphold commercial speech limitation, as in the GourmetTP
300
PT and GroganTP
301
PT 
cases. 
 B.  The Concept of Commercial Speech Protection in Europe 
 Both the European Court of Human Rights and The European Court of Justice declared 
commercial speech protection. However, both courts provided no explanation for such 
protection. 
 Previous analysis of the European cases leads to the conclusion that both courts justify 
limitations on the commercial speech by Member States. As many authors suggest, there is a 
 
TP
297
PT TCase C-159/90, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685 (1991).T 
TP
298
PT Id. at para 33. 
TP
299
PT See infra, Chapter V, Part I. 
TP
300
PT Case C-405/98, 1998 E.C.R. I-1795 (1998). 
TP
301
PT TCase C-159/90, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685 (1991).T 
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more “community-oriented” conception of freedom of expression in Europe than in the United 
States.TP
302
PT Moreover, in the decisions of both courts, Member States’ interests prevail over 
individual’s interests.TP
303
PT  
 Both European Courts base their decisions on the concept of “margin of appreciation”. 
This concept allows Member States to decide whether the freedom of expression should be 
protected. For example, in Markt InternTP
304
PT the European Court of Human Rights held that “a 
margin of appreciation appears essential in commercial matters, in particular in an area as 
complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition”TP
305
PT The Court repeated its holding in Markt 
Intern in several other cases and extended the principle to commercial advertisement. TP
306
PT  
 The main purpose of applying “margin of appreciation” in the commercial speech cases 
seems to support Member States’ ability to control commercial expression in their territories. 
Thus, while both European Courts declared that there was protection of commercial expression, 
in practice they have never overruled Member State’s restrictions on commercial expression. 
Unfortunately, in the decisions of the European Courts, “communitarian” values prevail over 
individual values. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions usually focus on individual 
rights protection.TP
307
PT 
 It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court giving “a margin of appreciation” to state laws. 
However, there are several explanations for why this doctrine dominates in Europe. The 
Contracting Members are independent states with its own state government. Europe or the 
European Union is not a federation. There is no central federal government and there are no 
 
TP
302
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 107; see also P.Birks, ed., Pressing Problems in the Law (1995). 
TP
303
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 107. 
TP
304
PT 133 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
TP
305
PT Id. at para. 3. 
TP
306
PT See Casado Coca v. Spain, 285-A Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1994) at para. 50. 
TP
307
PT See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 1171 (6Pth P ed., 2000). 
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states (provinces or subjects of federation).  It is seems almost impossible for the Court to 
develop the same principle of commercial speech protection for all European nations, when in 
some countries of Eastern Europe the freedom of expression is limited. Commercial speech may 
be “necessary” in one European society, and less important in another. The European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice do not have as much power and respect in 
Europe as the Supreme Court does in the United States.  Thus, one sees the completely different 
result may be achieved in the cases in Europe than in the United States.TP
308
PT However, to prove this 
contention, it is necessary to compare European cases and in the United States on the same 
subject matter. 
 
TP
308
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 109. 
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VI. DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THEIR PROTECTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
 In this chapter, cases in both Europe and in the United States on the same subject matter; 
contraceptive and abortion advertisement; regulation of advertising of the legal professions and 
tobacco advertisement are analyzed. The analysis shows that in the United States legal and non 
misleading commercial speech is protected in approximately all of the cases. While in Europe, 
commercial speech does not receive any exclusive protection from the courts. 
A. Contraceptive and Abortion Advertising 
 In Europe, most of the cases concerning contraceptive and abortion advertisement 
originated in Ireland, which has the “most restrictive abortion laws in the West.”TP
309
PT   Such laws 
prohibit almost all the types of abortions and advertisement of the abortion services available in 
other States, in particular in the United Kingdom, are also prohibited.TP
310
PT 
 In Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan,TP
311
PT the European Court of 
Justice did not find the prohibition inconsistent with European Community law. In this case, 
however, the information on abortion services was published by student groups but not by the 
clinics. The Court held that Member State may prohibit student associations from publishing 
information about the abortion services in clinics of the other Member States, when “the clinics 
 
TP
309
PT Elizabeth Porter, Culture, Community and Responsibilities: Abortion in Ireland, 30 Soc. 279 (1996). 
TP
310
PT See  Rich, supra note 282 at 272. 
TP
311
PT Case C-159/90, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685 (1991). 
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in question have no involvement in the distribution of the said information.”TP
312
PT  The information 
was “not distributed on behalf of an economic operator established in another State.”TP
313
PT Thus, the 
Court’s decision was very narrow and applied only to student groups and not to the clinics.  
 The European Court of Human Rights, in another case, which involved Ireland and its 
prohibition on abortion services advertisement, held that such a ban violates Article 10 of the 
European Convention.TP
314
PT The Court held that Ireland cannot prohibit the organization from 
providing consultations about abortion services in another State to pregnant women in Ireland. In 
deciding the question whether such a restriction is “necessary in a democratic society” the Court 
noted that Irish laws do not prohibit women from obtaining abortion services in another State 
and that such a ban harms women’s health.TP
315
PT The year after the Court’s decision Ireland allowed 
distribution of the information about abortion services available in another State.TP
316
PT 
  However, it is obvious that the European Court of Human Rights was concerned more 
about woman’s health than commercial speech protection. If only commercial speech had been 
involved, then the Court’s decision would have been different.  
 In the United States, the issue of abortion services advertisement reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia. TP
317
PT The Supreme Court held that Virginia’s statute, which 
criminalized advertisement in Virginia newspapers of abortion services in New York, infringed 
protected speech.  
 
TP
312
PT Id. at para 33. 
TP
313
PT Id. 
TP
314
PT Open Door Counseling & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) at 268 (1992). 
TP
315
PT Id. at 267. 
TP
316
PT See Porter, supra note 303, at 285-6. 
TP
317
PT 421 U.S. 809 (1975); see supra, Chapter III, Part III. 
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 In Carey v. Population Services Int’l,TP
318
PT the Court invalidated a New York statute which 
banned advertising and display of contraceptives. The Court quoted Virginia Pharmacy and 
stated that there are “substantial individual and societal interests in the free flow of commercial 
information.”TP
319
PT Thus, the Supreme Court invalidated commercial speech restrictions not because 
a woman’s health issue was involved, as in the European cases, but because commercial speech 
had to be protected. 
 Again, in Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp.TP
320
PT the Supreme Court found a federal 
statute “prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements” to be 
unconstitutional.TP
321
PT The Court held that such mailings constituted commercial speech because 
they are “concededly advertisements, refer to specific products, and are economically motivated” 
even when “they contain discussions of important public issues such as the prevention of 
venereal disease and family planning.”TP
322
PT 
The Court again protected advertising for contraceptives because it “not only implicates 
‘substantial individual and societal interests’ in the free flow of commercial information, but also 
relates to activity that is protected from unwarranted governmental interference.” 
 Thus, even when contraceptive and abortion advertisement was protected by both courts, 
the motivations for protection were different. For the European Court of Human Rights the most 
important reasons were the “moral implications”, the fact that restrictions on information of 
abortion services create a risk to the health of women. The U.S. Supreme Court protected such 
advertisement because of “substantial individual and societal interest in the free flow of 
 
TP
318
PT 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
TP
319
PT Id. at 700-1. 
TP
320
PT 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
TP
321
PT Id. 
TP
322
PT Id.  
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commercial information”TP
323
PT, and because such advertisement constituted commercial speech 
which should be protected under the First Amendment. 
A. Regulation of Advertising of the Legal Profession 
In Europe, most of the states allow lawyers to advertise.TP
324
PT However, there are different 
restrictions, which vary from state to state.TP
325
PT  
In the leading European case on this issue, Casado Coca v. Spain,TP
326
PT the European Court of 
Human Rights held that governmental prohibitions in Spain on almost all lawyer advertising did 
not violate Article 10 of the European Convention. The lawyer, in this case, had been sanctioned 
by the Barcelona Bar Council for advertising his legal services in a local homeowners’ 
newsletter.TP
327
PT The European Commission recognized the right of the citizens to the information 
and held that Article 10 had been violated.TP
328
PT The Court, however, held that even “objective, 
truthful advertisements might be restricted in order to ensure respect for the rights of others or 
owing to the special circumstances of particular business activities and professions.”TP
329
PT The court 
held that in this case such circumstances existed and there was no violation of Article 10. 
In the United States in Virginia Pharmacy,TP
330
PT the U.S. Supreme Court noted that on questions 
concerning commercial advertisement, lawyers might be treated differently.TP
331
PT However, in 
Bates v State Bar of ArizonaTP
332
PT the Court held that the state cannot prohibit lawyers from 
 
TP
323
PT Id. 
TP
324
PT See Louise L. Hill, Lawyer publicity in the European Union: Bans Are Removed but Barriers Remain, 29 Geo. 
Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 381, 383 (1995). 
TP
325
PT Id. 
TP
326
PT 18 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser.A) (1994). 
TP
327
PT Id. at 3. 
TP
328
PT See Shiner, supra note 12 at 98. 
TP
329
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advertising their legal services. The Court rejected a number of justifications provided by the 
state, such as “adverse effect on professionalism” and the claim that attorney advertising was 
“inherently misleading”.TP
333
PT 
 However, one year later in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,TP
334
PT the Court held that 
in-person solicitation might be restrained. The case involved “ambulance chasing” by an attorney 
who solicited contingency-fee employment from accident victims.TP
335
PT 
 In PrimusTP
336
PT the Court permitted solicitation by mail. However, it is easy to distinguish 
this case from Oharlik because in Primus political issues were involved. The attorney, during her 
volunteer work for the ACLU, wrote a letter to a woman who had been sterilized asking her if 
she wants to file a lawsuit against a doctor who participated in the program of sterilizing 
pregnant mothers.TP
337
PT In another case, the Court invalidated Missouri restrictions on lawyer 
advertisement and held that it should be protected by the First Amendment because it concerned 
lawful activity and was not misleading.TP
338
PT 
 In later cases the Court struck down a number of limitations on lawyer advertisement. In 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Councel, TP
339
PT an attorney from Ohio, “ran a newspaper 
advertisement advising readers that his firm would represent defendants in drunk driving cases 
and that his clients' "full legal fee [would be] refunded if [they were] convicted of DRUNK 
DRIVING." TP
340
PT Later, the same attorney ran another newspaper advertisement about his 
availability to represent women who had suffered injuries resulting from their use of a 
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333
PT Id. at 368-70. 
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TP
335
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337
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340
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contraceptive known as the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. The advertisement contained a 
line drawing from the device and stated "if there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our 
clients."TP
341
PT The office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio filed a suit because 
such advertisements violated a number of Disciplinary Rules of the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility.TP
342
PT The Court held that such advertisements were not misleading, and the state 
could not restrict such advertisements. Justice White noted that the fact that “some members of 
the population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive can not justify suppressing it.”TP
343
PT 
 Iin Shapero v Kentucky Bar AssociationTP
344
PT, the Court followed its decision in Zauderer to 
strike down a Kentucky restriction on mail solicitation by lawyers of specific people known to 
need legal services. The Court stated that solicitation in this case was not misleading or false. 
The Court distinguished this case from Ohralik because the later case was dealing with face-to-
face solicitation.TP
345
PT  
 However, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. TP
346
PT the Court upheld, by a vote 5-4, a Florida 
Bar prohibition denying lawyers the right to send mail solicitations to victims or their relatives 
during the thirty day period after an accident. The Court held that the State had a substantial 
interest “in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones 
against invasive, unsolicited contact by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in 
the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered.”TP
347
PT The Court also stated that 
restrictions are valid only for a short period of time, and that there are alternative sources for 
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lawyers to advertise their services in, for example, television, radio and newspapers.TP
348
PT Justice 
Kennedy, in dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg stated that restrictions on 
speech cannot be justified just because the expression might offend someone. “On the contrary,” 
he noticed, “we have said that these "are classically not justifications validating the suppression 
of expression protected by the First Amendment."TP
349
PT  
 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court protects lawyers’ advertisement as a form of commercial 
speech if it is not misleading or false. However, in several cases the Court found that the State’s 
interest, to protect the privacy of injured victims, is substantial and upheld restrictions on speech.  
 The European Courts, according to the concept of “margin of appreciation”, leave the 
Contracting Members a right to decide whether the lawyers’ advertisement should be permitted. 
Such a passive position by the European Courts raises doubts for any form of commercial speech 
protection under the European Convention of Human Rights.  
B. Tobacco Advertisement 
In the United States and Europe, the issue of commercial speech protection was raised when 
the government imposed restrictions on the advertisement and promotion of tobacco products.TP
350
PT 
However, while the government attempted to lower the damage of cigarettes to the health of the 
population, tobacco manufacturers sought to relieve themselves from legal and political limits on 
advertisement of their products.TP
351
PT 
 
TP
348
PT Id. at 633-4 
TP
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The tobacco advertisement issue was raised in Europe after the Directive 98/43/EC, which 
prohibited all tobacco advertisement, was adopted by the European Parliament and Council.TP
352
PT In 
Germany v. Parliament and Council,TP
353
PT Germany requested annulment the Directive. In another 
case, the United Kingdom wanted to take measures against the Directive’s ban.TP
354
PT One of the 
main arguments against the Directive was that it violates freedom of speech. Some authors also 
suggest that prohibition of all tobacco advertising does not have any sufficient grounds for 
justification.TP
355
PT The Advocate General rejected these claims and stated that “commercial 
expression does not contribute in the same way as political, journalistic, literary or artistic 
expression do, in a liberal democratic society.” TP
356
PT He also noticed that there is a substantial 
interest in protecting public health here.TP
357
PT However, the European Court of Justice, 
notwithstanding the Advocate General claims, annulled the Directive on the ground of a 
violation of Article 10.TP
358
PT  
 However, a few years later, the European Parliament and Council issued a second 
Directive in relation to tobacco products.TP
359
PT The Directive contained mandatory health warnings 
as a labeling requirement. This Directive was challenged by tobacco manufacturers in the 
European Court of Justice through the request of the United Kingdom government.TP
360
PT The basis 
for the challenge was “the lack of a proper legal basis.”TP
361
PT However, this time the Court did not 
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annul the Directive, and the freedom of speech issue was not raised by the tobacco 
manufacturers.TP
362
PT  
 In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first issued  regulations on 
the tobacco products advertisement in 1995.TP
363
PT The Tobacco manufacture challenged these 
regulations in U.S. Food and Drug Administration v Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. TP
364
PT as 
a freedom of speech violation. They won on the ground that the “FDA lacks authority to regulate 
tobacco products as customarily marketed.”TP
365
PT  
In the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, which regulated tobacco advertisement, was 
adopted and was signed by almost all the states.TP
366
PT   One year later Massachusetts adopted much 
more restrictive regulations with the purpose of limiting any tobacco use. TP
367
PT In the United States 
in Lorrillard Tobacco v ReillyTP
368
PT manufacturers and sellers of cigarettes challenged a 
Massachusetts regulations restricting sale, promotion, and labeling of tobacco products. The U.S. 
Supreme Court used Central HudsonTP
369
PT test and held that:  
Regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco or cigars within 1,000 
feet of school or playground violated the First Amendment; regulations prohibiting 
indoor, point-of-sale advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars lower than 5 feet from 
floor of retail establishment located within 1,000 feet of school or playground violated 
First Amendment; but regulations requiring retailers to place tobacco products behind 
counters and requiring customers to have contact with salesperson before they are able to 
handle such products did not violate the First Amendment. TP
370
PT 
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The Court held that the Massachusetts regulations satisfied HCentral Hudson'sH third step 
“by directly advancing the governmental interest asserted to justify them.”TP
371
PT The Court stated 
that the government provided proof that there is a problem with underage use of smokeless 
tobacco and cigars and that evidence which limits tobacco advertisement will decrease underage 
smoking. Notwithstanding the fact that the governmental interest is substantial and compelling, 
regulations do not satisfy Central Hudson fourth step. The Court found that regulations will 
generate “a complete ban on the communication of truthful information.” TP
372
PT Thus, the 
government failed to show that regulations are not more extensive than necessary.TP
373
PT 
Hence, both courts, the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, did not 
uphold governmental bans on tobacco advertisement on the grounds of a freedom of speech 
violation.  
However, it is possible to presume that such bans would be upheld by the European Court 
of Justice on the basis of “margin of appreciation” if the initiator of the tobacco restrictions was a 
Member State and not the European Parliament. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 There are several conclusions that follow from the summary and comparison of the cases, 
legislation materials, and doctrines of the United States and Europe. 
 First of all, the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice have declared that commercial speech will be protected. Courts in the 
United States and Europe stated that false and misleading speech would not be protected. 
 Next, in the United States, the commercial speech doctrine developed from certain civil 
rights decisions, and commercial speech protection extends to pure commercial speech.TP
374
PT In 
contrast, in Europe, while it was declared that Article 10 of the European Court of Human Rights 
covers commercial speech, pure commercial speech does not receive any protection in practice. 
Analysis of the Courts’ decisions allows one to conclude that if the expression in the case was 
purely commercial then both European Courts would uphold the restrictions on advertising.TP
375
PT If 
the case involved not only commercial speech, but also political speech, freedom of press or a 
health issue, both Courts protected expression. Thus, commercial speech in Europe is covered by 
law but not protected by the Courts. 
 Thirdly, while in the United States, decisions on commercial speech issues stress 
individual rights, in Europe both Courts base their decisions on the concept of “margin of 
appreciation”. European Courts leaves much discretion to Member States to decide whether or 
not commercial speech should be restricted. Moreover, European culture lacks “the fundamental 
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cultural mistrust of government, which is so influential in the U.S.” TP
376
PT There are different 
explanations for this tendency. There is no central government in Europe. European Union or 
Council of Europe is not a federation. All Contracting Members are independent states. 
However, there are different questions arise. Which also a “community-oriented” conception 
dominates the decisions of the European Courts. The European Courts do not protect rights for 
information even though the European Convention provides them. 
Fourthly, in contrast to the European Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a rationale 
and  explanation for the protection of commercial speech. Moreover, the Court developed a four-
part test to determine whether or not the commercial speech should be protected. It is impossible 
to find in European cases any rationale for the commercial speech doctrine. 
 Analysis of the cases in the United States and Europe of the same kind of commercial 
speech demonstrate even more that both European Courts do not protect types of commercial 
speech including advertisements in the legal profession and, in some cases, tobacco 
advertisement. In contrast, in the United States in most cases concerning lawyers’ advertisement 
and tobacco advertisement, the Supreme Court overruled restrictions on commercial speech.  
 Finally, the Supreme Court plays a much more important role in commercial speech 
protection than European Courts. To limit commercial speech in the United States, the state 
should have a substantial and compelling interest. Both European Courts are passive on this 
question; they leave absolute power to Contracting Members to decide whether or not 
commercial speech should be protected in their society. Unfortunately, such a passive position 
by the Courts makes freedom of expression and right to information, protected by the Article 10, 
useless. The European Convention on Human Rights might become a part of the constitution of 
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the European Union. TP
377
PT In that case, Section 2 Article 10, which provides much discretion to the 
Member States, probably would be revised “in order to offer the most effective protection.”TP
378
PT 
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377
PT Bernhard Jurgen Bleise, Freedom of Speech and Flag Desecration: A Comparative Study of German, European 
and United States Laws, 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 471, 490  (1992). 
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